Churn Baby Churn: Why TIDAL’s Losses Only Tell Part Of The Story

Screen Shot 2015-04-01 at 10.07.52 AM
TIDAL, the Jay-Z led streaming service may have a problem retaining user it has signed up. 

The Wall Street Journal recently published some pretty terrible numbers on the train wreck that is called TIDAL. Naturally, the entire industry started piling on Jay-Z’s music startup, determined to show what a cluster the company finds itself in. But to us music vets, it’s pretty much the same old, same old. Losing lots of money isn’t the problem—it’s actually required these days if you’re running a digital music company; due to the enormous costs of content, and the fight for paying subscribers. It should be pointed out that Spotify’s losses are much greater than TIDAL’s reported numbers.

The bigger problem that TIDAL faces is revenue growth. According to the filings the WSJ reported on, TIDAL lost $28 million on revenues of $43 million in 2015. And while that’s a lot of money to lose, Spotify lost nearly $194 million, and Rhapsody lost $35 in 2015. But the scale of both of those companies is impressive. Spotify nearly doubled its revenue last year, recording of $2 billion. Even Rhapsody logged around $200 million last year.

So what gives? Why is TIDAL’s revenue just a drop in the bucket compared to its competition? I think it has to do with its reliance of exclusives to sign up subscribers. A caveat here: this is speculation based on one report from Sweden, which might not even show the accurate financial picture of the company. A source told the Journal that the filing didn’t include all U.S. revenue, for example. Additionally, it doesn’t account for 2016, when TIDAL rolled out wave after wave of impressive exclusives, from Rihanna to Kanye to Beyoncé. So it doesn’t really account for its power moves.

However, if you just divide the revenues of each company and into each self-reported subscriber count, TIDAL lags well behind in revenue per subscriber. Rhapsody banks $57 per sub per year and Spotify is an impressive $87. TIDAL didn’t announce year end subs, but in March it said it had 3 million, so let’s just say they had 2.5 million at year’s end, for a total of $17 per subscriber. Don’t like that number? Fine. Let’s just go on the TIDAL subscriber number reported on October 1, 2015 of a million subscribers. Based on that, TIDAL is still generating half the revenue per sub of Spotify and a 25 percent less than Rhapsody, a company with a significant base of lower-revenue bundled subscribers.

I know what you’re thinking. How can this be? TIDAL doesn’t have a free offering. It also claims that a huge number of its subs are on the $20 plan for better audio quality, much higher than all streaming services. Shouldn’t TIDAL be generating tons of cash per user? Well, yes. Except for one nagging little problem: churn.

Churn, the amount of subscribers that quit your service every month, is the canary in the coal mine for a subscription business. Low churn means people are happy. High churn is a disaster, as you need to replace all those subscribers just to tread water–let alone to grow. Churn is the one metric subscription companies obsess over. Netflix has famously spent a great deal of effort lowering its churn and is considered the gold standard for an entertainment company.

In the next stage of subscription services, churn will be one of the most important factors in determining health of businesses. There were reports this summer that Apple Music’s churn was significantly higher than Spotify’s, and the company has recently been recruiting talent to deal with its problem. So it’s just not TIDAL that has to worry about it. However, the company is much more suspect to massive churn that its competitors.

My theory is that TIDAL does indeed harvest a lot of credit cards from people who just have to have access to The Life of Pablo or Lemonade. But the minute the exclusive is over, those subscribers leave. In droves.

I would suggest that TIDAL has done a great job at signing people up. And a terrible job at converting them to the service long term. Mostly because TIDAL isn’t marketing the service outside of the only place where you can get exclusives for a short period of time.

One of the measures of performance for companies I track is App Annie data on downloads for iOS in the U.S. It doesn’t tell the whole story, but it does suggest popularity of an app. More downloads: more new customers. One would expect small changes from time to time, but steady, consistent demand. Kind of like Spotify’s iOS downlaods:

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In comparison to the TIDAL’s downloads over the past year:

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That’s one bumpy ride.

You’ll also note that the scale between Spotify and TIDAL is significantly different. Spotify never dropped out of the top 30 apps, whereas TIDAL has bumped between 1 and 1,250 since churning out the exclusives.

TIDAL in June announced it has 4.2 million subscribers after signing up 1.2 million fans during Lemonade alone. But let’s not pay attention to how many subscribers TIDAL adds. It’s all about how many it retains.

One last caveat: maybe I’m wrong. Maybe TIDAL is signing up tons of people and they’re sticking around. But if that is the case, the company should have lots of cash on hand to pay its bills in the form of operating income. The fact that seems to be short of cash and it isn’t able to turn its exclusives into a consistent funnel of customers leads me to believe that something isn’t working with exclusives.

WSJ: Jay Z’s Music Streaming Service Tidal Posts Huge Loss in 2015

Recode: Spotify is adding more subscribers and is losing its chief revenue officer

Billboard: Rhapsody Nears 3.5 Million Global Subscribers

 

                                                                                                   

 

Grow Fast And Burn Cash

By all accounts, the music service Rhapsody has been on a roll. Subscriber numbers continue to grow. The company announced an innovative use of a trial based on plays that makes it appear like free music on Twitter. It recently acqi-hired a team of developers who built a social sharing application named Reveal.

Disclosure: I dirtied Rhapsody’s white boards when I worked there from 2004 until 2013. 

More revealing, however, is the cost of growth. Real Networks is compelled to disclose Rhapsody’s financials in its 10-K reports, and the most recent results are brutal. Rhapsody lost $8.9 million in the first quarter of 2015. The Seattle-based company lost $1.6 million in the same quarter in 2014. Rhapsody had to borrow $10 million in cash from Real Networks and its other owner–the private equity firm Columbus Nova.

Do You Know ARPU?

So how can the company grow subscribers, but losses continue to escalate? It’s pretty simple. The company’s average revenue per user (ARPU) is slipping. Badly.

Most, if not all, of Rhapsody’s growth has come from their cellular carrier partnerships, like T-Mobile in the United States, Telefonica in Latin America and Vodaphone and SFR in Europe. These deals are awesome for distribution. But the deals provides just a fraction of the revenue a retail customer in the US provides the company. So instead of making, say, $5 bucks a month for each retail customer who signs up directly, Rhapsody might make $0.50 on per each user month of Brazil’s Vivo Musica, if not even less.

As I posted earlier, Rhapsody’s cellphone carrier strategy is a sound one, if the company can do two things: make up the loss of ARPU by dramatically increasing the volume of partner subscribers and bolster its brand to sign up a number of high ARPU customers the company has traditionally attracted in the US.

Rhapsody, just like everyone in digital music, is probably feeling the pressure of Spotify’s successful year. The company continues to sign up tons of high-value premium customers as it expands around the world. There’s some evidence that Spotify is taking the oxygen out of the market. Spotify’s premium users grew the equivalent of Rhapsody’s entire subscriber base in two months at the end of last year. The company grossed over a billion dollars in revenue last year.

And Rhapsody’s losses are a drop in the bucket compared to Spotify. The Swedish-based digital music juggernaut lost $184 million in 2014, according to recent reports. Based on how the company continues to harvest the private markets for more and more cash, Daniel Ek’s company makes Rhapsody’s losses look good in comparison. Rhapsody appears to be more like a rock-ribbed conservative banker compared to Spotify’s sailor-on-shore-leave approach to spending. We are clearly still in a Grow Fast or Die Slow stage of development, and Rhapsody has playing the best hand it has available.

The digital music market has long valued growth at any costs over rational business planning. That may be changing as Universal Music Group is starting to question the value of free music. There’s been many reports that Apple is pushing UMG to have Spotify limit or end its unending stream of free music as a way to sign up paying customers.

UMG CEO Lucian Grainge may see Apple as the best of both worlds: a 100 percent paid service that has access to hundreds of millions of credit cards. If Apple is the White Knight that will save the music business from itself, or just another Trojan Horse is an open question.

Free Expansion: Rhapsody Joins Spotify in Giving Away Music

Wiz on Rhapsody on Twitter
Can Wiz Khalifa help deliver his Twitter followers to Rhapsody.

Today Rhapsody announced that it is launching free playback through an integration with Twitter’s audio cards. It works this way: if you are a subscriber and share a song, album or playlist on Twitter, anyone following you can play it for free in the Twitter mobile app.

It’s a pretty smart integration that solves a few problems for the service:

  • It encourages Rhapsody’s users to share music with all their friends. This is something that Spotify has done very successfully with its social tools baked into the app.
  • It gives artists an opportunity to drive potential customers to Rhapsody from their social channels, which could create an additional revenue stream for artists.
  • It is focused on mobile plays, which is where a majority of listening has migrated to and where Rhapsody’s potential customers hang out.
  • It limits the amount of free music by pegging the free playback to someone with an account and followers on Twitter. You can only listen on Twitter, which is very different than the all-free, all-the-time Spotify offerings.
  • It gets Rhapsody in the news, as you can see by all the press the company has generated by announcing the integration at SXSW today.

Social Mores

Chief Financial Officer Ethan Rudin says that the project is an experiment in the US. He had a couple press quotes that seemed a bit off target.

“It’s going to be a huge experiment in how we make music social again,” Rudin told Geekwire’s Todd Bishop.

“Music has been a bit of red-headed stepchild” on social, Rudin told CNET’s Joan Solsman.

I think he forgot to add the phrase ‘on Rhapsody’ to both of those points.

One could argue that Spotify’s ability fuel enormous grow is because of its very slick social functions coupled with the a mass number of users. Meanwhile, Rhapsody’s loyal and active customers listen to tons of music in the service, but without sharing of that playback it’s locked in a vacuum. It’s been a weakness that the service has yet to address in its decade plus existence.

The integration looks nice. But it still requires Rhapsody user to do the work to help the company mine Twitter for customers. What has made Spotify so damn sticky is that its social features are automatic and on by default. On its service, you have to opt out to not share. Meanwhile Rhapsody requires that you tweet your heart out about your favorite songs to let everyone know what you’re listening to.

About Face

I must point out that Rhapsody has been extremely critical of free music over the years. As Spotify has grown enormously over the past couple of years Rhapsody has ratcheted up the attacks on free music.

When the Taylor Swift vs Spotify controversy was at its peak, Rhapsody Board of Directors Co-Chairmen Rob Glaser and Jason Epstein authored an opinion piece in Billboard that called free music “throwing out the baby with the bath water.” Ethan Rudin last summer told Buzzfeed that free streaming services send the wrong message to potential customers. “If you continually offer somebody the perpetually free model, they’re always going to opt not to pay for it,” is the way Rudin put it.

It should also be noted that today you cannot play on-demand tracks for free on Spotify’s mobile app, but you can play anything on the Rhapsody catalog for free on Twitter. So what happened to aligning around 100 percent paid music?

Look, I get it. A company can change its mind. Business conditions always change and if you don’t adapt, you have a good chance at being swept away. But what is equally important is that we believe in what you say. Consistency is extremely important in the music business, as it has a checkered past.

Scoring points on your competitors for giving away music while planning your own free music offering does smack a bit of talking out of both sides of ones mouth. To say the least.

Disclosure: I worked at Rhapsody for nine years before leaving in September of 2013.

More Free Advice

Billboard: Why Streaming (Done Right) Will Save the Music Business

Buzzfeed: Rhapsody CFO: Taylor Swift Is Right — Free Streaming Is Bad For Music

CNET: Twitter rocks! Rhapsody kicks off free songs through tweets

Geekwire: Rhapsody launches music sharing on Twitter: Full-track playback without subscription

Growing Concerns: Does Music Subscriber Growth Cripple Profitability?

I recently wrote about how Rhapsody is facing issues as it expands to a worldwide audience and partners with cellphone carriers in Europe, Latin America and the United States. Part of my analysis centered on shrinking margins from signing up new customers on services and how difficult it becomes to manage the business when you don’t control the customer base. I also pointed out how relying on other companies to do your marketing erodes your brand, leading to a limited retail funnel.

Disclosure: I worked for Rhapsody for nine years before leaving in September 2013.

Rhapsody’s 2014 results were recently released in a RealNetworks’ regulatory filing and there are two conclusions that are easy to draw from the report. (Note: RealNetworks owns 43 percent of Rhapsody and includes the company’s financials in its own 10K SEC filing.)

  1. The growth strategy is working. Outside of the reported two million worldwide customers Rhapsody recently trumpeted, the company also increased revenues by 23 percent in 2014 over the previous year. Rhapsody’s revenues are at $173 million a year, which are rumored to be much larger than those of Deezer, the France-based music service.
  2. The growth is coming at a cost to Rhapsody. The company lost $21.3 million in 2014, up from 14.6 million in 2013. And it’s just not overall losses that are mounting. Rhapsody losses are continuing even when factoring in subscriber growth. Based on its 2014 losses and its reported subscribers, Rhapsody lost $8.53 per subscriber last year, although the company has cut its loss per customer in the past two years.

Growth and Losses

Rhapsody’s losses are a drop in the bucket when compared to Spotify. In 2013 the company reported operating losses of $128 million. While the company didn’t report subscribers, it has been suggested the company had around nine million paying subscribers at the end of 2013, leading to a $14 loss per sub in that year.

Screen Shot 2015-03-03 at 12.38.58 PMIt should be pointed out that Spotify’s paying subs are supporting all the free users who generate very small amounts of money for the company through adverting sales. Spotify says that its average active user (a combination of paid and free) generates $41 per year in 2013, while Rhapsody generated $93 per sub for the same year.

To grow, Rhapsody not only saw losses per sub drift slightly upwards, it also had to eat into its margin. In 2014 revenue per sub sunk to $69. And Rhapsody’s growth isn’t coming anywhere near Spotify. In fact, the Stockholm based streaming giant’s growth is outpacing every company in the industry by a wide margin. It now has over 15 million paying subs and 60 million worldwide users. Spotify picked up six million paying subs to Rhapsody’s one million in 2014.

So what does all this mean? A few conclusions.

  1. Brand Matters: In the excellent MusicREDEF newsletter, my friend Matty Karas recently mused, why when people talk about streaming music, they only refer to Spotify. There are scores of companies with offerings, many of them in business for a long time. But Spotify has broken through and is on-demand streaming’s only household name. Its brand has fueled incredible subscriber and free user growth for the company.
  2. The Model Matters: What makes this so intriguing is the three distinct approaches these companies have taken for on-demand streaming.Rhapsody traditionally focused on all paid customers, utilizing their own retail channel, before pivoting to distribution partners for growth. It has achieved modest growth, but at a significant operational cost.Deezer only operated in territories with carrier partners. The results? Deezer had significant subscriber growth, but the revenues are below Rhapsody. So to the outside world, Deezer looks like a much bigger deal than within the industry. Deezer also is facing competition for carrier deals. In a shift of its model, Deezer launched a high-bitrate service in the US for $20 a month, although the company has not been strongly marketing the product. Despite the massive amount of money raised and worldwide operations, could Deezer be the first huge causality in on-demand streaming?Spotify built its own customer funnel by giving away expensive free music and has found a way to significantly grow free users, paying customers and revenues. The costs have been astronomical, but Spotify is dominating streaming music, dwarfing all its direct competitors and–maybe even more importantly–reaching mass consumer appeal.
  3. Distribution Eats Margin: My last piece on Rhapsody suggested the company’s margins face significant downward pressure because of its cellphone distribution scheme. And now we see the numbers showing that erosion. Rhapsody will have to hope that a) it can sustain or even amplify its growth rate through partners and b) retain its own higher margin customer funnel. If not, Rhapsody’s revenue per sub will continue downward.
  4. The Economics Are The Economics: Regardless of approach or business model, on-demand streaming music is an expensive business to launch and operate. There’s no way around losing millions of dollars just to be one of few who survive. All left standing will require a huge war chest, access to raise even more money and the intestinal fortitude spend a fortune in content, distribution and marketing costs.
  5. More Pain Coming: Apple and YouTube are expected to roll out on-demand music services in 2015. The pressure to grow–and raise more money to pay for the growth–will increase on every company in the market. As the old adage goes: let the beatings continue until the morale improves.

More Growing Problems

Geekwire Filing Reveals $21M Loss for Rhapsody, Despite Jump in Revenue and Subscribers

NY Times As Music Streaming Grows, Spotify Reports Rising Revenue and a Loss

Bloomberg Spotify Hits 10 Million Paid Users. Now Can It Make Money?

Jonmaples.com The Roaring Mouse: Rhapsody Faces Its Future

The Roaring Mouse: Rhapsody Faces Its Future

Mark Mulligan recently commented on an announcement from Rhapsody that trumpeted the Seattle-based granddaddy of streaming music’s impressive growth over the past couple years.

His analysis:

Enter investment firm Columbus Nova who acquired an undisclosed stake in Rhapsody in September 2013. A reorg and a repositioning process followed paving the way for strong subscriber growth. Rhapsody had 1.5 million subscribers one year ago. If it continues to grow at its present rate it should hit 3 million by July this year. And if it sustains that growth into the start of 2016 it could find itself the second biggest subscription service globally. Current number two Deezer appears to be slowing so 2nd place could be a realistic target for next year. Quite a turn around for a service that looked like it was falling by the wayside 5 years ago. 

Surprisingly, Mark’s blog piece was extremely thin on the particulars about Rhapsody’s turnaround. I was surprised as he is one of the sharpest analysts in digital music.

Rhapsody’s growth is impressive. But the seeds of Rhapsody’s recent growth were sown years before Columbus Nova showed up to the party. When the company spun out as a standalone entity from its parent, Real Networks, it was given a few on-air marketing dollars from its other owner, Viacom Networks. Previously Viacom had poured hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising credits to Rhapsody, which it used to advertise the service on MTV, Comedy Central and other on-air properties. The efficacy of those dollars was questionable, as the company had around 800,000 paying subscribers. It was just too early to market on-demand music to a mass audience.

After the spin-out, Rhapsody was left without a sizable marketing budget nor the money to invest in a free tier like Spotify or Pandora. So the company was forced creatively figure out how to attract customers. One of the hardest things streaming services faced then–just like now–is getting consumers to plop down their credit card to pay to them. The president at the time, Jon Irwin. opted to partner with companies who already had access to credit cards—cellular carriers.

Precarious Partners
Before we get into that, here’s a little bit about the economics and goals of partnerships between carriers and music services. These kinds of deals have been seen by the music industry as the answer to building mass audiences of subscribers. Customers might ask themselves why they are paying $10 a month for Rhapsody, but if the charge is included in their cellphone bill, they might never see it. It’s always considered better to tap someone else’s customers than build your own.

Deals like these are extremely difficult to navigate. Labels are terrified of offering discounts for the service, which is a requirement to get carriers to agree to the deal. Carriers are reticent to pay for content that customers may or may not use. And everyone wants someone else to take a margin hit. It’s up to the streaming service to get everyone on board and craft a deal that will be successful.

The best deals are ones where all parties–and the consumer–are happy.

Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. A couple terrible examples: Deezer has built a massive worldwide audience of paying subscribers, and yet the rate of people who actually use the service is pathetic. Mark Mulligan reported that it could be as low as 20 percent. A low active rate infuriates subscribers and, therefore, carriers. While there will always be some level of inactives in a service, when it becomes huge, you aren’t building a distinct brand and service. Muve Music, which previously was offered through the Cricket pre-paid cellphone service, also had massive inactive users and really awful economics due to licensing deals it signed with music labels.

It’s critically important to build the right offering when selling the service. Music services on carriers come in two varieties: a bundled offering and a bolt-on service. In a bundle the consumer is buying a tiered plan that includes the music service. So for $70 a month, you subscribe to the Cellphone + Music and a bunch of other services. The bolt-on is much simpler and cleaner: add music for $5 or $10 a month. As a product guy, I much prefer the bolt-on. Why? Most of the inactives reside in the bundle and all those people represent a time bomb just waiting to blow up. Customers who quit in droves are expensive for everyone, but it tolls the death knell for the service.

And that’s the weakness with the marketing and distribution partnership through carriers. Specifically:

  • Sure the music service gets the massive benefit of not having to capture the credit card, but it also cedes control of the relationship with the customer.
  • With two parties involved, the company’s already thin margins selling music get deeply eroded, requiring the music service to rely on its own retail customers to prop up the distribution costs.
  • The service is completely reliant on the carrier to market to their customers, and the carrier may not be very motivated to do so.
  • The service can quickly lose brand equity, as the carrier might just call the service ‘Comes With Music’ instead of promoting its brand. If the customer is just subscribing to a generic music service this is a very bad thing, as the carrier could replace it at any time.

So the music services must walk a fine line:

  • Build and hold onto a strong brand presence that will motivate the carrier to do the deal in the first place.
  • Make sure the carrier does the right thing in selling the service and focus on the brand.

Do it wrong, and you end up like Muve Music, which AT&T sold to Deezer at auction prices earlier this year after acquiring what was left of the struggling Cricket Wireless. Do it right, and hockey stick growth follows.

A former colleague thought the relationship between the powerful carriers and little music services reminded him of a blend between Aesop’s fable about the lion and the mouse and the Roald Dahl story about the crocodile and the dentist mouse. In my colleague’s telling of it, the powerful and hungry lion wants to eat the mouse, but to do so will ruin his only hope for repairing the tooth. So the mouse has to convince the lion to not eat him before he can fix the tooth. I’m sure you can imagine who is the lion and who is the mouse.

Dialing Up Deals
After months of negotiations, Rhapsody announced its first partnership with the pre-paid carrier MetroPCS in 2011. In the next few years the company announced deals with European carriers, followed by a global deal with Telefonica and then T-Mobile’s offering.

So far, so good. Solid growth. But it’s an open secret that Rhapsody’s brand has been fading for quite some time now. And the partnership strategy isn’t helping develop a strong brand identity. In their thirst to make the deal, the company is making their brand look more like a quilt than something unified. The service is known as Rhapsody on MetroPCS, Unradio on T-Mobile, MTV in Germany, Napster in Greece, Spain, Sonora in Latin America.

It’s an open question if it will be able to maintain its presence with Spotify taking up all the oxygen in the room with customers while YouTube Music Key and Apple’s iStreaming launches. The company has faced issues before and has been written off time and time again. It remains to be seen if it can grow, in particular in the U.S.

As the partnerships ramp, expect the company to face downward margin pressure. Those thin margins will start to eat into the overall revenue of the company. Growth is fantastic, but it could also harm the company’s bottom line.

Maybe even more important, the company needs to answer the hard question about what position it seeks to occupy in the marketplace. There probably is room for a white label music service that works well with big distribution partners like carriers and cable companies. But without a solid brand and a strong direct retail subscriber base, the company could start to see more pressure to deliver meaningful value. It’s far from clear if a mousy little Rhapsody can roar in a den full of lions.

Disclosure: I worked at Rhapsody for nine long rewarding, frustrating, awesome and ridiculous years before last year’s layoff.

More Rhapsodizing

Music Industry Blog: How Rhapsody Became A Top Tier Player Again

Music Ally Rhapsody’s Napster expands across Europe and plots ‘laddered’ pricing strategy

Billboard Why Streaming (Done Right) Will Save The Music Industry

GeekWire Rhapsody Tops 2.5M Subscribers, Up 60% From Last Year

2015 Digital Music Predictions

The past year was a doozy for digital music. We saw Beats Music come and go with a rush, Spotify grow significantly and digital track sales hit the skids as streaming continued to grow in popularity.

And for everything that happened, 2014 probably will be remembered as a transitional year. Big players like Apple and YouTube have yet to really show their cards. The impact of Spotify as a worldwide music platform has yet to really take hold. Many existing services still continue to solider on, despite significant changes that have impacted the marketplace.

The next 12 months will see a significant reshuffling of the deck of existing companies and new entries. We might also start to see the outlines of the future as the next generation of music companies start to debut. Because one thing that remains constant: there’s always someone who will invest in digital music, regardless of the financial results or past performance.

My picks for the top stories for 2015:

Say Goodbye: At Least Two Services Will Consolidate

We are moving quickly from a startup world into one where the big boys are playing. Apple and YouTube will join Amazon and Google Music Play All Access as the giants. While I have grave misgivings if their product offerings will be very good, it might not matter. With access to their digital stores, consumers might just activate the AppleStream or Music Key apps just because it’s simple.

Other companies will find themselves at risk, especially those who are forced to market their services directly to consumers. Rdio, Deezer, Wimp (Tidal in the US), Rhapsody, Slacker and a host of others will come under pressure to find alternative ways to market to customers, band together or go the way of other failed services.

YouTube Music Key Will Deliver A Flat Note

YouTube has the biggest opportunity to grow paid streaming products. YouTube has a massive audience, which is great. But their audience has been conditioned to consider the service free. There are signs that Spotify has already cannibalized YouTube’s consumers who want to pay for music, which might make it even more difficult for the company to get people to pay.

Because of this, YouTube’s paid subscribers will disappoint the industry during 2014. It might take a year or two for the company to perfect the product and find those who really want to pay for the service.

Apple’s streaming service will be a mess, and it won’t matter

The Cupertino geniuses do many things well. Streaming music has not been one of them. While it has the team from Beats Music to rely on, the company is known to ignore new talent acquired and turn it over to their internal team.

It wouldn’t be surprising to see their streaming service follow the iTunes Radio, which was supposed to be a Pandora killer, but just attracted those who use it because it’s already installed on their device. The company will get it right eventually, but streaming services are a completely different beast than anything it has tried. So expect some serious growing pains.

But because the service will be pre-installed on so many phones, it will sign up loads of customers through in-app purchase. Apple is also pressuring labels to lower the monthly cost of streaming, which could lead to solid growth.

Spotify Will IPO and More Artists Will Window

It is really difficult to judge how the public market operates and many things could happen that could affect Daniel Ek’s IPO prospects. We could see a downturn in the economy. Tech stocks could hit the skids again. The market might not like the prospects of the company’s future when it starts releasing business performance and data. But if Spotify overcomes all these hurdles, it will get its IPO out.

And regardless the stock price, a successful IPO will make many of its employees and early investors a lot of money. Expect to see a backlash from artists after this event, with more and more holding back new music on the service to give retail channels first shot at making money.

Pandora Will Become Musicians’ Most Hated Digital Service

Of all the companies in digital music today, none shows the most contempt for musicians and songwriters as Pandora. While the company has had some outreach, it also has tried to bend itself into a broadcast service to get a lower rate, decided to not pay a single dime for any song released before 1972 (as did XM Sirius), and then had the balls to countersue the ‘60s era group Turtles for violating its first amendment rights.

Pandora is already facing a firestorm for its exceptionally low payments to songwriters, but continues to aggressively lower royalty costs, regardless of how it affects its relationship with artists. While much of the money Pandora is trying to save goes to big corporate conglomerates, it’s the independent artists that always come to the forefront in these stories. Expect the hate to expand in 2015.

Amazon Will Continue To Play Its Game

Seattle’s commerce behemoth will focus on what it always does: keeping its customers buying more stuff. Many expected Amazon to offer a premium service in 2014, but instead the company created a back-catalog offering that kept customers in its Prime service longer.

The company had a rough 2014 with its failed Fire phone launch. While its nose is bloody from that setback, don’t expect that Jeff Bezos’ company will change its game plan. Focus on the customer buying: regardless if it’s a digital download, diapers or dishrags.

2014 In Review: Some of the best stories from the past year.

The Elephant In The Room: Another Cultural Landslide’s very complex and very loooong analysis of streaming music, discovery and the listener.

Streaming Report Card: Music industry analyst Mark Mulligan gives us a rundown on how streaming did in 2014.

Stop Blaming The Internet: Gang of Four’s Dave Allen gives a deep dive into the issues surrounding streaming and artists.

The Streaming Price Bible: David Lowrey’s in depth look at who’s paying what. While I might quibble with Lowrey about why those numbers are so low, the streaming rates on this post is illuminating and depressing.

The Album Cycle: Consequence Of Sound News Editor Chris Coplan looks at the nature of music promotion as the industry is changing.

Five Reasons The Music Industry Hates Pandora The Most: Music lawyer and blogger Jake London lays it out.

Spotify Has Six Years Of My Music Data, But Does It Understand My Tastes: Stuart Dredge digs into the taste profile.

Taylor Swift Announces A World Tour And Pulls Her Music From Spotify: Ben Sisario on everyone’s favorite spatting couple.